This paper examines the labor market for CEOs in the …nancial sector from 1988 to 2007, using a new hand-collected sample of 1,655 CEO successions. We document that there is a signi…cant role of outside successions, as about one out of two successions involves an outside hire. In addition, using di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates, we study the link between the labor market for …nance CEOs and …rm performance. We document that (1) there is a large performance gap between inside and outside successions, as outside successions are followed by signi…cantly larger improvements in …rm performance; (2) the performance gap between outside and inside successions is larger for …rms with an insider dominated board of directors; (3) the performance gap widened after an important deregulation event (the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). These results are robust to using a battery of …rm performance measures (short-run and long-run stock market returns, and several long-run operating performance measures) and a matched sample approach to address selection issues. Overall, our …ndings suggest that managerial human capital is very valuable in the …nancial industry, and weak internal governance hurts …rm performance by limiting the scope of labor market competition.
Introduction
Internal governance mechanisms and managerial labor market in the US …nancial industry have recently received considerable attention in the wake of highly publicized CEO successions at the top …nancial institutions in the US such as Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo.
In addition, the debate on the causes and cures of the 2007 …nancial crisis has highlighted the key economic role played by top corporate managers at …nancial institutions and generated a great deal of interest in the consequences of CEO successions for …nancial …rm performance.
However, while recent work has started to study the role of skill di¤erentials for non-executive employees (see Philippon and Reshef (2008) ), there is surprisingly little evidence on the role of an arguably important input, human capital at the top of the executive ladder in the US …nancial industry. 1 In order to …ll this gap in the literature, we examine the labor market for CEOs in a new hand-collected sample of 1,655 CEO successions in the US …nancial sector from 1988 to 2007.
In particular, we examine whether CEO succession decisions matter for …rm performance. This question has implications for three broad issues. First, evidence for non-…nancial …rms points to higher incidence of outside successions, which suggests that the importance of the external labor market for CEOs has increased over the last two decades. As con…rmed by the evidence in Philippon and Reshef (2008) , …nancial …rms are relatively more complex and require specialized skills, which makes the question of the value of human capital at the top likely to be important.
Second, a key challenge facing corporate boards of …nancial institutions is to identify and attract superior replacement managers. Evidence on whether or not boards actually do so is necessary to address the e¤ectiveness of internal monitoring. Finally, recent policy interventions have imposed heavy constraints on the ability of large …nancial institutions, such as, for example, Bank of America, to tap the external labor market for CEOs. Thus, it is important to document evidence on whether or not these constraints are likely to hurt …nancial …rm performance.
Our sample consists of 1,655 nontakeover-related CEO successions in the US …nancial sector over the period 1988 to 2007. An important advantage is that we hand-collected our CEO succession data for the universe of US public …nancial …rms reporting annual …lings (Proxy or 10-K) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Thus, we are able to o¤er a comprehensive picture of the CEO labor market in the US …nancial industry, which is in contrast to previous studies that focus on relative large (and mostly industrial) public …rms in the S&P 500 or S&P1500 and, thus, include only a handful of the very largest US …nancial …rms.
Our …rst set of …ndings is about the short-term and long-term stock market reaction to the announcement of CEO succession decisions. We …nd that investors expect outside CEOs in the …nancial industry to signi…cantly outperform insiders, as both short-term announcement returns and average abnormal returns for the three-year post-succession period are signi…cantly higher for outside CEO successions. In addition, we …nd evidence consistent with both a governance and a human-capital explanation of this …nding. In particular, the return di¤erential is higher for …rms with insider-dominated boards of directors (de…ned as …rms whose boards have 40 percent or more inside directors). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that insiderdominated boards of directors are expected to hurt …rm performance by limiting the scope of labor market competition and hiring 'bad' CEOs from inside the …rm. In addition, we …nd that the return di¤erential widens after deregulation in 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) that removed barriers separating traditional banking, insurance, and securities underwriting and thereby increased complexity of bank operations. This result suggests that there is a "skillbiased" e¤ect of deregulation, in the sense that the increased complexity of …nancial …rms led to a bigger return di¤erential between inside and outside successions.
A well-known issue with event-study results is that their interpretation is di¢ cult, since a management change may signal that …rm performance is worse than expected, that …rm performance will improve as a result of the management change, or that the …rm is "in play" as a takeover target. Moreover, top management changes are likely to be partially anticipated due to the poor pre-turnover …rm performance. Thus, in order to provide a more convincing assessment of the e¤ect of CEO succession decisions on …rm performance, we examine changes in several measures of …rm performance (operating return on assets, operating returns on sales, and Tobin's Q) around management changes. We …nd that, on average, there is a signi…cant performance gap between inside and outside successions. This overall result masks considerable di¤erences between …rms with di¤erent internal governance structures, as, again, the gap is larger for …rms with insider-dominated boards. Moreover, the gap in operating performance widens after 1999. Finally, the gap remains signi…cant even after 2003, suggesting that it is unlikely to be driven by outsiders taking in the expansion stage of the credit cycle aggressive risks that later materializd during the …nancial crisis. 2 Although our results on changes in operating performance are akin to di¤erence-in-di¤erences, 2 We thanks Steve Sharpe for suggesting this additional test.
in that we can estimate CEO impact in a setting that explicitly controls for time-invariant differences in …rm characteristics that may a¤ect performance (see Perez-Gonzalez (2006) for a similar approach in the context of family successions), there is an important selection issue we have to address. In fact, inside successions involve both observable di¤erences in …rm characteristics, which might by time-varying, and unobservable di¤erences, making a direct comparison between inside and outside successions problematic. Ideally, we would like to compare the change in performance of an inside appointment …rm to the same …rm's performance change had the …rm appointed an outside CEO. Since the counterfactual is not observed, we must …nd an empirical proxy for the hypothetical performance without succession type change. As our main identi…cation strategy, we construct a nearest-neighbor matching estimator, following Abadie and Imbens (2007) . We estimate a logit regression to identify observable …rm characteristics that predict inside successions. We then match each inside CEO succession to the outside succession that, at the time of the succession, had the closest predicted probability of being an inside succession, or propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . CEO successions are a natural application for matching since the succession decisions are made by corporate boards who, like the econometrician, have to rely mostly on public information to assess outside CEO quality. Our results for performance changes around CEO successions relative to the matched control sample largely con…rm and are somewhat stronger than our baseline results.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper o¤ers the …rst direct large sample evidence on the labor market for CEOs in the US …nancial industry. Our evidence broadly suggests that …nancial CEO selection decisions matter. Our results stand in sharp contrast to previous studies that focus on non-…nancials and tend to …nd mixed and at best weak evidence of performance di¤erentials between insiders and outsiders. The strong performance gap between inside and outside successions suggests the external labor market for CEOs has a special role in the US …nancial industry. This …nding has two main implications for the literature.
First, our …nding that di¤erences among CEO successions are important for …nancial …rms, especially after the 1999 deregulation, is consistent with the evidence for non-executive employees in Philippon and Reshef (2008) , and supports the notion that the …nancial industry is relatively complex and skill-intensive. In addition, our evidence furthers the understanding of the role of the external labor market for CEOs. Existing work is limited to mostly non-…nancial …rms (e.g. Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Parrino (1997) , and Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001)). Our evidence shows that the external market for CEOs is an important source of value for …nancial …rms. Given both the broad set of new variables we examine and the large cross-section of …rms we include in our hand-collected dataset, our investigation represents to best of our knowledge the …rst large-sample study of the impact of the external labor market for CEOs on …nancial …rm performance.
Our study is also complementary to the small but growing literature that attempts to identify the e¤ect of CEOs on …rm performance. Bertrand CEOs and …rm performance in the …nancial industry has been surprisingly overlooked. Thus, our paper is the …rst to show that …nancial CEOs matter.
Second, our …nding that the performance gap between inside and outside succession is larger for …rms with insider-dominated boards has important implications for the recent governance debate and the standard criticism of board of directors for not doing a good job at monitoring CEOs (see, for example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) ). Our evidence is complementary to the basic premise of this argument, and suggests that identifying and attracting superior CEO replacements is indeed an important, although often overlooked, function of boards of directors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 , we discuss our sample selection procedure and describe our samples of CEO successions in the US …nancial industry.
In Section 3, we present event-study results documenting announcement-period and long-term abnormal returns associated with our sample management changes. In Section 4, we document changes in accounting performance measures around management changes. Section 5 concludes.
Data
To explore the link between CEO successions and …rm performance in the US …nancial industry, we construct a database of the …nance CEO labor market that contains detailed information on CEO turnovers, as well as multiple empirical proxies for …rm performance. This section details how we constructed the dataset and the collection process for each of our variables.
Sample selection
We hand-collected our CEO succession data for the universe of US public …nancial …rms re- We classify each CEO turnover according to whether it was forced or voluntary and whether the incoming CEO is an insider or an outsider to the …rm, following standard criteria in the literature (Parrino (1997) , Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) ). We classify successor CEOs who had been with their …rms for one year or less at the time of their appointments as outsiders.
All other new CEOs are classi…ed as insiders. Finally, for each succession we determine exact announcement dates -which are the earliest dates of the news about incumbent CEO departure and successor CEO appointment. Departures for which the press reports state that the CEO has been …red, forced out, or retired or resigned due to policy di¤erences or pressure, are classi…ed as forced. All other departures for CEOs above and including age 60 are classi…ed as not forced.
All departures for CEOs below age 60 are reviewed further and classi…ed as forced if either the article does not report the reason as death, poor health, or the acceptance of another position (including the chairmanship of the board), or the article reports that the CEO is retiring, but does not announce the retirement at least six months before the succession. 3 This careful classi…cation scheme is necessary since CEOs are rarely openly …red from their positions. Table 1 presents an overview of our CEO succession data set for the US …nancial industry with descriptive statistics on total CEO successions, and successor type (inside vs. outside) for each year (Panel A) and for two sub-periods (…rst and second half of the sample) covered by our sample (Panel B). We are able to give a signi…cantly more comprehensive picture of the CEO labor market in the US …nancial industry than previous studies since our sample includes a more detailed collection and considerably larger cross-section of …rms (Compustat universe) than S&P500, S&P 1500, or Forbes sub-samples, which have been the standard focus of the literature on industrial …rms. 4 Our statistics con…rm results for non-…nancials suggesting that the nature of the CEO labor market has changed signi…cantly in the last two decades with respect to the 1970s and 1980s. The likelihood that the new CEO comes from outside the …rm are much higher than what it had been documented in previous decades.
Both Panels in Table 1 show that, as it has been documented for non-…nancial …rms, the …nancial industry was also subject to an important recent trend in the CEO labor market:
there is an increased prevalence of …lling CEO openings through external hires rather than through internal promotions, suggesting that there has been a material change in the CEO selection process in the 1990s. About …fty percent of the departing CEOs in the last two decades are replaced by executives who have been employed at the …rm for one year or less.
This frequency of outside appointments is about in line with recent studies of industrial …rms, although somewhat higher. In fact, studies that focus on non-…nancials have …gure that range between 35 and 40 percent. This di¤erence is due not only to possible di¤erences between …nancials and non-…nancials, but also to the fact that the samples typically used in previous studies only includes relatively larger …rms, which tend to rely more on inside hires. outside hires accounted for only 15% to 17% of all CEO replacements, only half as large as our …gures since 1998.
Firm Performance and Firm-Level Controls
We supplement our data with several measures of …rm stock market and operating performance, as well as a variety of …rm-level controls whose importance in the CEO labor market has been documented in the literature. All measures are at calendar year-end.
Our stock market-based measure of performance is based on stock returns from CRSP We use three measures of …rm operating performance from Compustat: (1) operating return on assets (OROA), de…ned as the ratio of operating income to the book value of assets (2) return on assets (ROA), de…ned as the ratio of net income to the book value of assets; (3) operating return on sales (OROS), de…ned as the ratio of operating income to sales. For each of these measures, we de…ne its industry-adjusted counterpart by subtracting the median of the relevant industry (2-digit SIC) and year, and its industry and performance-adjusted counterpart by subtracting the median of the relevant variable of a control group of …rms with similar industry-adjusted performance. The control groups are created by dividing COMPUSTAT …rms into deciles sorted by the relevant variable (e.g. industry-adjusted OROA) the year prior to transition.
The yearly median of the relevant group of …rms (ex-event) is then used as the control for each …rm-year observation (see Barber and Lyon (1996) for more details on the construction of the performance-adjusted variables).
Our main set of controls includes …rm size (logarithm of total assets), and CEO age. The role of …rm size in the CEO labor market is an important implication of competitive models such as ours (see Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2007) ). Previous research suggests that CEO pay and turnover rates are a function of CEO age (see, for example, Milbourn (2003) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999)'s study of the sensitivity of mutual funds manager turnover to performance).
Finally, we include in our data set several measures of …rm internal governance. In particular, we include the size and independence of the board of directors (see Weisbach (1988) and Kaplan and Minton (2006) for evidence on boards and CEO successions). Our main variable for board independence is a dummy that takes the value of one if the board is insider-dominated (top quartile of the distribution of board independence in our sample, which correspons to a proportion of insiders of 40 percent or more).
Event-Study Results
Our research setting allows us to implement direct tests of the relation between CEO successions and …rm performance. In this section, we o¤er event-study evidence of the impact of CEO succession decisions on performance for …rms in the US …nancial industry.
Short-Term and Long-Term Event Studies of CEO Succession Decisions
Before moving on to our main analysis, we examine announcement and long-term abnormal Table 2 shows evidence that indeed investors expect a positive impact of CEOs hired from outside the …rm on performance. In particular, we present mean abnormal returns for a two-day event window around CEO succession announcements for all successions, and for successions when management changes are broken down by internal and external successions (top panel), and by insider-dominated board and post-1999 deregulation period (lower panel).
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Column 1 of Table 2 shows that on average CEO successions are associated with a statistically signi…cant (albeit small at 0.8%) abnormal return. The positive average return is in contrast to previous studies that use earlier samples of larger and non-…nancial …rms and tend to …nd insigni…cant returns on average (see, for example, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004)). However, as shown in Column 2 of Table 2 , this di¤erence is likely explained by the fact that internal appointments, which constitute a much larger fraction of the total sample in earlier studies, are associated with abnormal returns that are not di¤erent from zero. By contrast, investors react positively to appointments of outside CEOs, which constitute a larger fraction of our sample and on average are associated with a signi…cant 1.7% return. Overall, outside successions carry a statistically signi…cant 1.8% excess return with respect to inside successions, consistent with the market's anticipation that outside hires will outperform inside hires. This performance di¤erential is much larger than documented in studies of CEO successions for non-…nancial …rms, which is consistent with the notion that managerial human capital is relatively more valuable in the …nancial industry (see Philippon and Reshef (2008) ), but also with the idea that governance issue might be more severe.
The lower panel of Table 2 explores the merit of two main explanations for the performance gap between insiders and outsides, di¤erences in the value of human capital and internal governance issues. To explore the role of internal governance issues, we ask whether the performance gap is larger among …rms with insider-dominated boards (de…ned as …rms where more than 40 percent of the members of the board of directors are insiders), which would be consistent with the hypothesis that insider-dominated boards of directors are expected to hurt …rm performance by hiring underperforming insiders. Consistent with this hypothesis, we see a somewhat larger 2.1% excess return for outsiders.
Finally, in order to evaluate the hypothesis that di¤erences in the value of human capital are driving the gap between insiders and outsiders, we ask whether the gap widens after deregulation in 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) that increased complexity of bank operations by removing barriers separating traditional banking, insurance, and securities underwriting. Consistent with di¤erences in the value of human capital between insiders and outsiders, the bottom panel of Table 2 shows that outside CEOs'excess returns is higher (2.6%) after 1999.
In summary, our short-term event study shows that investors expect outside CEOs in the …nancial industry to signi…cantly outperform insiders, and more so for CEO succession decisions made by insider-dominated boards and after 1999., which is consistent with both human capital and governance factors potentially driving the expected performance di¤erential.
Long-Term Event Study
A potential concern with shot-term announcement returns is that, as emphasized by Khurana to the appointment of a popular and charismatic CEO and thus lead to a positive stock market reaction that is unrelated to actual CEO performance. In order to partially addresses this overreaction concern, we consider long-term abnormal returns, which are more likely to capture subsequent information on the value of CEO human capital that is revealed slowly over time.
As it is standard in the literature (see, for example, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) and Perez-Gonzalez (2006)), we calculate monthly calendar-time portfolio returns for portfolios that buy shares in …rms subject to a CEO transition within the following 36 months, as well as for portfolios invested in …rms that underwent a succession in the preceding 36 months. We estimate abnormal returns using the four-factor market-model (see Fama and French (1993);
and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). Table 3 reports the resulting average abnormal returns for the three-year pre-succession period (Panel A) and the three-year post-succession period (Panel B). 6 Before CEO transitions, …rms tend to earn signi…cant negative abnormal returns, which is in line with the standard …nding in the literature that underperforming …rms are more likely to replace their CEO. Presuccession underperformance tends to be more pronounced for outside successions, consistent with another standard result in the literature that …rms are more likely to appoint an outsider when they are relatively more underperforming.
Turning to Panel B of Table 3 , the portfolio of post-CEO transition …rms earned on average statistically signi…cant abnormal returns of about 5%, signi…cant at the …ve-percent level. 6 Abnormal returns are estimated using calendar-time portfolio regressions. In each month t, all …rms subject to a CEO succession within the next (prior) 36 months are included in that month's pre (post) transition portfolio. Mean portfolio returns, rp t are used to estimate abnormal returns using the following regression: (rp t rf t ) = + 1 (rm t rf t ) + 2 SM B t + 3 HM L t + 4 U M D t + " t ; where rf t is the risk-free rate calculated using one-month Treasury-bill rates, (rm t rf t ) is the market risk premium, calculated as the di¤erence between the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from CRSP less the risk-free rate, SM B t is the return di¤erence between portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, HM L t is the return di¤erence between portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks, and U M D t is the return di¤erence between portfolios of high prior-return stocks and low prior-return stocks. The reported abnormal returns are the intercept ( ) estimated from the regression above. The implied one-year abnormal return is calculated as[(1 + ) 12 1]. Data on the factors were obtained from Ken French's website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french. Consistent with our previous …nding of a more positive short-term announcement return for outside appointments, portfolios of …rms that appoint outside CEOs earn higher abnormal returns after transitions relative to …rms that appoint inside CEOs. The performance gap between outsiders and insiders in terms of one-year excess returns is of about 4%. Thus, there is about 4% return premium earned by investors of …rms that appoint outside CEOs. Finally, consistent with both governance and human capital factors driving the performance gap, the return premium is larger in the sub-sample of appointments by insider-dominated boards (about 7%) and for appointments made after 1999 (about 7%).
Main Results
Overall, both short-term and long-term abnormal returns support the view that outside CEOs are more likely to have a positive impact on …rm performance. However, these results are only suggestive and do not establish that there is indeed a positive impact of outside CEOs on …rm performance since the results might also be driven by anticipation e¤ects, such as the fact that appointment decisions reveal information related to …rms'prospects, irrespective of the value of CEO human capital. Moreover, lower signi…cance might also be driven by the fact that inside transitions were expected and already incorporated into prices. In order to address these concerns, in our main analysis we pursue an alternative strategy based on using changes in operating performance. Thus, our strategy is testing whether there are signi…cant di¤erences in …rm performance before and after CEO successions for …rms that appoint inside vs. outside CEOs.
The advantage of this approach, which is akin to di¤erence-in-di¤erences, is that we can estimate CEO impact in a setting that explicitly controls for time-invariant di¤erences in …rm characteristics that may a¤ect performance (see Perez-Gonzalez (2006) for a similar approach in the context of family successions). We use three di¤erent measures of operating performance which are standard in the CEO turnover literature: (1) operating return on assets (OROA), (2) operating return on sales (OROS), and (3) valuation ratios (Tobin's Q), which addresses the concern that, while e¤ective at addressing anticipation issues, one potential limitation of operating performance measures is that they only capture current pro…tability. We report results for the di¤erence between these measures three years after and one year prior to CEO appointment. We consider industry-adjusted and industry-and prior performance-adjusted versions of the three measures to address potential concerns with the results being driven by industry-wide trends or simply mean-reversion with respect to prior performance. 7 The results are reported in Table 4 , which reports mean di¤erences in …rm performance before and after CEO transitions. Consistently across our three di¤erent measure of performance, the average di¤erence in performance three-year after CEO successions minus performance oneyear before transitions for the entire sample is not statistically di¤erent from zero. This result is in line with studies of CEO successions for non-…nancial …rms (see, for example, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004)). However, again consistently across our three di¤erent measure of performance, when we classify …rms by succession type (inside vs. outside succession), we …nd large di¤erences-in-di¤erences between inside and outside successions. In economic terms, our estimates indicates a gap in performance between insiders and outsiders ranging from 25 to 50 percent of the pre-transition unadjusted level of performance. Finally, consistent with both governance and human capital factors driving the performance gap, the gap is signi…cantly larger in the sub-sample of appointments by insider-dominated boards and for appointments made after 1999. Table 5 reports results that are aimed at answering this question. In particular, we now use our di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy to consider a variety of …nancial, operating, and risk taking …rm policies (these …rm decisions are analogous to the ones studied in Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). Our results on the impact of CEO talent on …rm decisions paint a picture that …ts remarkably well anecdotal accounts of outside CEOs as aggressive professional turnaround specialists. In particular, outside CEOs are more likely to cut leverage, to increase internal …nancing (cash -not reported), and to generate higher cash ‡ows. In addition, and perhaps surprisingly, outside CEOs do not appear to improve performance by increasing …rm risk. In fact, appointments of outside CEOs lead to larger reductions in …rm total risk (as measured by total return volatility) compared to appointments of inside CEOs. Finally, con…rming our results on the performance gap, di¤erences in …rm policies between inside and outside CEOs are more pronounced for appointments by insider-dominated boards and for appointments made after 1999, which lends further support to the idea that both governance and human capital factors are important.
A potential concern with this evidence is that although outside CEOs took more risks, these risks need not necessarily have materialized within three years from their appointments.
In order to address this concern, we consider the sub-set of post-1999 appointments starting from 2003. Since we track performance up to three years subsequent to these appoitments, this sub-sample includes CEO successions for which we observe at least one one of subsequent performance overlaps with the …nancial crisis since 2006. In unreported results available upon request, we have repeated our analysis in Panel B of Table 4 
Identi…cation
An important concern with our main results on inside vs. outside successions is that, even though we control for pre-succession performance, there are other variables that can e¤ect di¤erential …rm performance around CEO successions, including, for example, …rm size. Thus, part of our estimated impact of CEO succession decisions might be attributed to these variables rather than type of succession itself. For example, since large …rms are more likely to hire insiders, it might be that part of the subsequent performance improvement is simply due to outside CEOs being chosen to run smaller …rms that are easier to turn around.
In the ideal empirical experiment, we would compare the performance of an inside appointment …rm to the same …rm's performance had the …rm appointed an outside CEO. Since the counterfactual is not observed, we must …nd an empirical proxy for the hypothetical performance without succession type change. Our approach is a natural starting point since we compare average ex-post changes in performance of …rms that appoint inside CEOs to the expost change in performance of …rms that appoint outside CEOs. This di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach would provide a valid estimate of the treatment e¤ect of the treated if assignment to the treatment group were random. However, basic theoretical considerations and previous evidence on CEO successions suggest that this assumption is not likely to hold in the data. In fact, when we test di¤erences in pre-succession …rm characteristics across the two groups (inside vs outside appointments), we …nd signi…cant di¤erences in …rm size and performance, with inside appointments associated with larger and relatively less underperforming …rms. Economically, these di¤erences re ‡ect the endogeneity of CEO succession decisions.
In order to isolate the real e¤ects of CEO succession type on corporate performance from selection e¤ects, our main strategy is to construct a nearest-neighbor matching estimator, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Abadie and Imbens (2007) . While we do not observe the criteria used to select inside vs. outside CEOs, the matching procedure reconstructs this information using observable characteristics. We construct the control sample in two steps.
First, we run a logit regression to predict succession type (inside vs. outside CEO) based on …rm characteristics. We set the binary dependent variable to 1 if the …rm appoints an inside CEO.
We then regress the inside CEO indicator on controls for …rm characteristics. Based on the results in the existing literature for non-…nancials, we include …rm size (the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the beginning of the year before the appointment), …rm performance (as measured by our three proxies at the beginning of the year before the appointment), and …rm board characteristics (size and insider-dominated dummy). We also include dummies for years.
In unreported results available upon request, we …nd a weak relation between pre-transition …rm performance and the likelihood of observing an inside appointment (with underperforming …rms being less likely to appoint an insider), which is consistent with previous studies. Also consistent with previous studies, we …nd that larger …rms and …rms with insider-dominated boards are signi…cantly more likely to appoint inside CEOs (see Weisbach (1988) 
Next, we use the predicted values from the logit regression (propensity scores) to construct a nearest-neighbor matched sample for inside CEO appointments. In each year, we choose, with replacement, the outside CEO appointments with propensity scores closest to those of each inside appointment. We use the propensity score as the match variable to reduce the dimensionality of the matching problem. 8 Table 6 contains the results. For each performance measure, the …rst column shows the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates from Table 4 (Panel A), while the second column reports the di¤erence with respect to the matched sample. Clearly, robustly across the three performance measures, we continue to …nd a signi…cant impact of CEO succession decisions on …rm performance and a large performance gap between inside and outside CEO successions. Finally, con…rming our previous results, the performance gap of insiders with respect to the matched sample is more pronounced for appointments by insider-dominated boards.
Conclusion
CEO successions are important instances when managerial human capital is in play. We argue that focusing on the labor market for CEOs in the US …nancial industry can augment our understanding of the role of managerial human capital and …rm internal governance as determinants of …nancial …rm performance. In a large hand-collected sample of CEO turnovers over the last two decades, we …nd robust evidence that outside CEOs performed signi…cantly better than inside hires. Moreover, this result is stronger for CEOs hired by insider-dominated boards and after an important …nancial deregulation event in 1999. Our results cannot be explained by temporary over-reaction or anticipation e¤ects as they are derived using long-term 8 We also use the procedure of Abadie and Imbens (2007) to correct for remaining bias due to (ex ante) di¤erences between the treatment and control samples. The procedure estimates an auxiliary OLS regression of the e¤ect of the match variables on the outcome variable (in the control sample) and uses the estimates to adjust for di¤erences in the match variables between the treatment and control samples. This correction ensures, for example, that an outlier insider with a propensity score too high to closely match does not drive our results. In unreported results available upon request, we …nd that this adjustment has a very small e¤ect on our result, which are essentially unchanged. measures of operating performance and are robust to addressing selection on observable size or pre-transition performance. Finally, we o¤er suggestive evidence that the impact of outside CEO successions is related to classical turnaround skills. This table reports short-run cumulative abnormal returns around CEO successions for …rms in the …nancial industry (SIC 6000-6999) during the period from 1988 to 2007. Abnormal returns are calculated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The (0,+1) window of analysis is relative to actual announcement dates of CEO appointments (in days), where t=0 is the day of the announcement. Stock returns data are from CRSP. Row [1] reports results for all sample, Row [2] restricts the sample to …rms with 40% or more insiders on the board (upper quartile of the distribution), and Row [3] restricts the sample to years after the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of signi…cance are denoted by , , and for statistical signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. transition portfolio. Mean portfolio returns, rp t are used to estimate abnormal returns using the following regression: (rp t rf t ) = + 1 (rm t rf t ) + 2 SM B t + 3 HM L t + 4 U M D t + " t ; where rf t is the risk-free rate calculated using one-month Treasury-bill rates, (rm t rf t ) is the market risk premium, calculated as the di¤erence between the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from CRSP less the risk-free rate, SM B t is the return di¤erence between portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, HM L t is the return di¤erence between portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks, and U M D t is the return di¤erence between portfolios of high prior-return stocks and low prior-return stocks. The reported abnormal returns are the intercept ( ) estimated from the regression above. In each panel, Row [1] reports results for all sample, Row [2] restricts the sample to …rms with 40% or more insiders on the board (upper quartile of the distribution), and Row [3] restricts the sample to years after the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of signi…cance are denoted by , , and for statistical signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table reports changes in …rm performance for …rms in the …nancial industry (SIC 6000-6999) during the period from 1988 to 2007 around CEO successions. The change in performance is calculated from one year before to three years after CEO succession.
We report results for three performance measures: (1) operating return on assets (OROA); (2) operating return on sales (OROS); and (3) market to book value of assets (Tobin's Q). These measures are industry-adjusted using the median performance measure of the relevant industry (two-digit SIC). For each performance measure, we report di¤erence between internal and external CEO appointments in the …rst column ("Raw") and di¤erence between internal CEO appointments and a nearest-neighbor propensity score matched sample of external CEO appointments in the second column ("Matched Sample"). Matching is done in each year of succession, with replacement. Row [1] reports results for all sample and Row [2] restricts the sample to …rms with 40% or more insiders on the board (upper quartile of the distribution). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of signi…cance are denoted by , , and for statistical signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. {2.792}
